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Diagnostic testing can be used for many purposes, including testing 
to facilitate the clinical care of individual patients, testing as an 
inclusion criterion for clinical trial participation, and both passive 
and active surveillance testing of the general population in order to 
facilitate public health outcomes, such as the containment or 
mitigation of an infectious disease. As such, diagnostic testing 
presents us with ethical questions that are, in part, already addressed 
in the literatures on clinical care as well as clinical research (such as 
the rights of patients to refuse testing or treatment in the clinical 
setting or the rights of participants in randomized controlled trials to 
withdraw from the trial at any time). However, diagnostic testing, for 
the purpose of disease surveillance also raises ethical issues that we 
do not encounter in these settings, and thus have not been much 
discussed. In this paper we will be concerned with the similarities and 
differences between the ethical considerations in these three 
domains: clinical care, clinical research, and public health, as they 
relate to diagnostic testing specifically. Via an examination of the 
COVID-19 case we will show how an appeal to the concept of 
diagnostic justice helps us to make sense of the (at times competing) 
ethical considerations in these three domains. 
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The ongoing SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, now (August 2021) 
over 18 months old, has proved to be the greatest public health challenge 
and most significant global health event since the 1919 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. This is so not just because of the scale, devastation, and human 
toll of the pandemic, but also because of some of the unique features of the 
disease itself. As has been well-documented, COVID-19 disproportionately 
causes severe illness among older adults, especially older males with 
certain underlying health conditions. The disease has entered the world at 
a unique time in human history, when large portions of the population are 
older and have age-related chronic conditions such as renal disease, 
diabetes, and hypertension, meaning that many more living individuals are 
susceptible to severe outcomes from this virus in a way that wouldn’t have 
been the case a generation ago (Onder et al. 2020; Begley 2020). It has also 
exposed an existing and pernicious set of underlying, unjust inequalities, 
resulting in a distribution of mortality and morbidity that 
disproportionately impacts communities of color and low-income workers 
in developed countries (Hooper et al. 2020), as well as long-standing, 
pernicious inequalities in health care provision and access to medicines 
that exist between developed and developing countries. 
 
One of the major challenges of the pandemic has been diagnostic testing 
for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Because of the danger of asymptomatic and 
pre-symptomatic transmission, testing is required in order to bring 
transmission of the disease under control, as it is the primary way in which 
to identify asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic cases and thus to control 
transmission via isolation of these individuals (Furukawa et al. 2020). 
Countries that have done well with testing (such as South Korea and 
Singapore) have fared better than other countries where testing has been 
more limited, such as the United States (Cheng et al. 2020). But testing in 
the context of this pandemic is, as in medicine and health care practice 
more generally, done for different purposes, and sorting through the 
rationale for COVID-19 testing, its different uses, and its relevance in 
different settings is a major conceptual and normative issue raised by the 
pandemic and the public health response to it. 
 
Even aside from the COVID-19 considerations we will examine in detail 
here, it is not an overstatement to say that that the process of diagnosis––
of which testing for infectious disease is an element––is the cornerstone of 
modern clinical medicine. This is because before the treatment or 
prognostic evaluation of any patient can begin, there must be at least a 
working diagnosis––some idea of what is causing the problem that brought 
the patient into the clinic in the first place. If a clinician does not begin the 
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clinical encounter by working to obtain an accurate, or at least close to 
accurate, diagnosis, then subsequent treatments prescribed for the patient 
are likely to be ineffective, and prognoses to be inaccurate. This means that 
clinicians must be concerned with the questions of when, how, and why to 
test their patients in order to best facilitate their individual health outcomes. 
 
But diagnostic testing also has purposes beyond that of facilitating the 
clinical care of individual patients: it can also be used as an inclusion 
criterion for clinical trials, or in certain cases to surveil for, contain, and/or 
mitigate disease. In these cases, the goals of the testing are different from 
those of clinical care, and so are the ethical issues that arise when testing 
is conducted in these other domains. All of these different purposes for 
testing are present in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they are 
not always carefully separated, and the running together of testing for 
clinical care and surveillance, in particular, has raised some important 
ethical and philosophical difficulties. 
 
In this paper we will consider some of these difficulties via an exploration 
of the concept of diagnostic justice (Kennedy 2021) in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, by examining the overlapping categories and the 
philosophical issues that arise out of diagnostic testing for clinical trial 
inclusion, public health surveillance, and testing to facilitate the clinical 
care of individual patients. In particular, we will focus on two areas of 
difficulty that require closer scrutiny: the possibility that individuals could 
confuse the goals of testing for public health surveillance with testing for 
clinical care, and the way that testing data is used to inform public health 
decision-making. We will argue that both of these areas raise issues of 
diagnostic justice regarding how testing is conducted and how testing data 
is utilized in managing the pandemic.1 Our aim here is to point out two 
areas of difficulty that require further investigation and fine tuning of 
testing policy in the future. The COVID-19 pandemic is still, as of the 
writing of this paper, very much underway, and there remains much to be 
learned about the global response to it. This paper is thus written in the 
spirit of raising some questions that deserve reflection and analysis as the 
entire world endeavors to understand what has happened (and is 




1 We refrain here from offering any judgment on whether testing policy for COVID-19 has failed to 
meet demands of diagnostic justice. The situation is still emergent, and we believe a sober judgment 
will need to be made retrospectively, once the pandemic is under control and there is more evidence 
available. We thank an audience at Georgetown University, for pushing us to clarify our aims here. 
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In the following section we will survey the different forms of testing for 
COVID-19 and then in section 3 we will outline some of the ethical issues 
that arise when these testing methods are employed. In section 4 we will 
discuss the idea of diagnostic justice and argue that issues of justice are 
generated by the uses of diagnostic testing in different settings. In section 
5 we will raise two ethical difficulties regarding diagnostic justice for 
COVID-19 testing. We will then draw out some implications of this 
discussion for diagnostic justice, testing, and global public health policy in 
section 6, before a brief conclusion in section 7.  
 
 
2. COVID-19 Testing Methods 
 
Types of tests 
 
There are three main types of tests currently in use for the 
diagnosis/detection of COVID-19 infection. Two of them (PCR testing and 
antigen testing) are used to detect active infection, while the third (antibody 
testing) is used to detect past infection with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The 
PCR test for COVID-19 infection is considered to be highly accurate, but 
at this time no data on the exact sensitivity or specificity of the test is 
available, because there is no gold standard to compare it to. However, 
estimates based on similar PCR tests for other diseases put the specificity 
of the COVID-19 test very high (close to 100 percent, barring lab or 
technician error), but sensitivity only at around 70 percent, due to the 
relative frequency of inadequate sampling as well as the disease’s variable 
incubation period (estimated as 2-14 days). Antigen testing, on the other 
hand, has the benefit of delivering results quickly (usually in about 15-20 
minutes), which can be useful in point-of-care treatment for patients, but it 
is less sensitive than PCR testing and thus delivers more false negative 
results. 
 
Antibody testing, in contrast to PCR and antigen testing, is used to confirm 
a past infection with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Because measuring antibody 
levels in a large segment of the population can help to determine how much 
of the population is or was infected with the virus, which in turn allows for 
an estimation of the level of herd immunity present in that population, 
antibody testing can be very useful for public health surveillance. Of 
course, measuring antibody levels in a population in order to estimate herd 
immunity is useful only if naturally derived antibodies do indeed provide 
immunity to the disease. Given preliminary data, this does seem to be a 
reasonable assumption (Spellberg et. al. 2021) in the case of COVID-19. 
 
 





In the clinical setting, COVID-19 testing is conducted on individuals for 
the purpose of diagnosing those patients who are either symptomatic, or 
who have had recent exposure to the virus, in order to facilitate their 
individual case management. In the context of a research trial, on the other 
hand, potential participants are tested as an inclusion criterion for the trial, 
in order to make sure that symptoms are due to COVID-19, rather than 
other respiratory infections or disorders. In the public health domain, there 
are at least three reasons why a COVID-19 test might be conducted: for 
screening, for passive surveillance, or for active surveillance. According 
to the CDC,  
 
The primary purpose of screening is to identify early signs and 
symptoms of a disease or health problem to implement early 
treatment or program intervention to reduce the likelihood of 
the emergence of disease or health problem and/or mortality 
from the disease in an individual. (Oleske 2009, 131) 
 
So far, COVID-19 tests have not been used for this purpose, although it is 
possible that in the future, especially if early treatment or prevention 
measures become available, that they might be. COVID-19 tests can also 
be used for the purpose of passive surveillance, which “is intended to 
monitor community- or population-level outbreak of disease, or to 
characterize the incidence and prevalence of disease” (Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention 2020). Surveillance testing is performed on de-
identified specimens, usually via antibody titer on samples obtained from 
clinics or hospitals, and thus the results are not linked to individual patients 
or participants. Because of this, surveillance testing cannot be used for 
individual patient care, however it is often used as decision-input for 
population level health interventions (Oleske 2009). The sort of testing for 
COVID-19 that is most often conducted in the public health domain is for 
the purpose of active surveillance. Confusingly, sometimes the literature 
(and the CDC) refers to this also as “screening”. However, the purpose of 
this kind of testing is different than screening, because the goal is not to 
treat or prevent disease in individuals, but rather to  
 
identify infected persons who are asymptomatic and without 
known or suspected exposure to SARS-CoV-2. [It] is 
performed to identify persons who may be contagious so that 
measures can be taken to prevent further transmission. (Oleske 
2009, 139)   
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In practice, however, this theoretically strict separation of goals often 
becomes blurred, and both participants in trials and the researchers that 
conduct them are forced to navigate potentially complicated situations. As 
an example, consider the role of testing in AIDS vaccine trials. Testing 
during AIDS vaccine field trials is essential in order to collect data on the 
efficacy of vaccine candidates. There is, quite simply, no way to know 
whether a vaccine is working or not without the testing of the subjects in 
the trial. Further, because of the manner of presentation and progressive 
nature of the disease, testing for HIV infection is necessary for the 
diagnosis of AIDS. What this means in practice is that while subjects can 
of course refuse to participate in the trial altogether, or to withdraw from 
the trial at any time, they cannot refuse testing and at the same time remain 
in the trial; if they are not able to consent to testing, then they cannot 
participate. However, during AIDS vaccine trials, testing also often ends 
up serving a de facto clinical function. Because these trials are mostly 
staged in developing countries with high baseline transmission rates, or in 
populations with a high risk of HIV infection, there is a significant chance 
that, even despite counseling, provision of different services, and of course 
some individuals getting the vaccine candidate itself, individuals in (but 
not only in) control groups will become HIV positive. There has been a 
longstanding debate about the obligations researchers have to subjects in 
these trials who become HIV positive during the course of the research 
(Berkley 2003). It is now generally accepted that researchers have some 
obligations to provide some form of care and support for HIV positive 
research subjects enrolled in clinical trials for HIV/AIDS therapeutics, 
such as the provision of antiretroviral medication and financial support for 
health infrastructure in communities from which participants are drawn 
(Richardson 2007). This means that in the course of conducting diagnostic 
testing for HIV infection for research purposes, data from this testing also 
has a clinical function, in that it identifies individuals that are (potentially) 
owed some form of care as part of the duty researchers owe to participants. 
So, while superficially similar to the ethical issues involved with 





Diagnostic testing for public health reasons is subject to a seemingly 
similar issue as is testing that is used in the context of clinical research, in 
that its primary goal is not (necessarily) to benefit the individuals 
submitting to the testing, but rather to protect the public health as a whole. 
But, as in the case of clinical research, there is, in practice, often a blurring 
of these goals. For example, submitting to testing to provide pieces of 
aggregate data for public health purposes can also have an important 
Ashley Graham Kennedy and Bryan Cwik: Diagnostic justice 
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clinical benefit for individuals, as it allows them to also provide 
information to their providers that can help to facilitate their own care. 
However, this blurring of clinical medicine vs. public health raises some 
difficulties for the ethics of COVID-19 testing, which we will discuss in 
section 5 below. 
 
When it comes to the question of whether individuals can refuse testing for 
public health purposes, the situation is far murkier than it is with clinical 
research. With passive surveillance, individuals can refuse testing without 
compromising the public health goals of collection of data, as long as there 
is a sufficient sample who will submit to testing (or some form of proxy 
data that can be gathered instead). But with active surveillance, the 
situation is different. This sort of testing, for example, is often required for 
things like crossing borders where mandatory quarantine orders or travel 
restrictions are in effect. Refusing to submit to testing in this kind of 
context can be grounds for the barring of entry or even for forcing 
individuals into mandatory quarantine. Active surveillance requires a high 
volume of testing; during the COVID-19 pandemic, different countries 
have taken different tacks when it comes to mandating testing during active 
surveillance. Though compelling testing (as in China) raises some serious 
ethical questions, leaving testing voluntary (as has been the case in the 
United States) raises its own difficulties (which we will also discuss in 
section 5 below). 
 
There is an enduring question here about whether testing for public health 
surveillance can be compelled. On the one hand, there is a clear public 
health rationale based on prevention of harms to others for making testing 
mandatory, at least in certain circumstances.  
 
On the other hand, as we will argue in the next two sections, the way testing 
data is used is not morally inert. Compelling individuals to submit to 
testing, and then using data in ways that either results in an inequitable 
distribution of the burdens of mitigation or neglects obligations of care to 
individuals would raise serious concerns. Whether compelling testing is 
justifiable, then, depends on a number of factors. Some of these factors are 
unique to the situation of testing for disease surveillance in public health, 
and some are shared with other domains in which diagnostic testing is 
employed (as we’ve noted, with testing for clinical research, where 
compelling testing as a condition of participation also raises questions 
about ancillary duties of care).2 So, the ethics of diagnostic testing for an 
 
2 We offer here no opinion on whether testing for COVID-19 in situations where it was left voluntary 
(such as in community testing in the United States) should have been mandatory. No general opinion 
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infectious disease such as COVID-19, while it raises some common 
questions in all scenarios (such as questions about a right to refuse a test 
as well as about balancing different goals of testing), is sensitive to 
differences in context between clinical care, clinical research, and public 
health settings. Understanding these differences is crucial to understanding 




3. Diagnostic Justice 
 
In biomedical ethics much has been written about the idea of justice as 
fairness, particularly as it relates to the allocation of treatments to patients, 
especially when these treatments are scarce resources in the community 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2020; Emanuel, et. al. 2020; Truog et. al 2020). 
However, at least to our knowledge, this concept has not been discussed in 
regard to diagnostic testing. It is our view, however, that in the case of 
diagnostic testing, as with health care generally, there are multiple, and 
sometimes competing, moral considerations that come into play when 
making decisions about allocating testing resources, using data, and 
compelling (or not compelling) individuals to submit to testing. In some 
instances, there are not enough diagnostic tests to go around (as was the 
case in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States), 
while in other cases, even when there is an adequate supply of tests, the act 
of testing itself can have differential impacts on the individuals being 
tested (this is further discussed in section 5, below) and thus there arise 
distributive considerations in how testing should be used and what 
resources should made available to those who submit to testing. In our 
view, what this means is that diagnostic testing is subject to demands of 
diagnostic justice (Kennedy 2021). That is, diagnostic justice requires both 
that the burdens and benefits of testing be distributed equitably and that 
diagnostic resources be allocated fairly. Thus, diagnostic justice, like other 
forms of justice,  
 
 
is possible, as the rationale for compelling testing is sensitive to highly local factors––any justification 
for compelling testing will depend at least to some degree on how much harm results from a voluntary 
testing regime, and this will always be something that must be settled on a case-by-case basis. All we 
want to argue here is that, unlike in testing for clinical care, testing as part of public health surveillance 
could in principle be compelled, and that the differences between these circumstances make a moral 
difference on this issue of compelling diagnostic testing. Further, there is more going on here than just 
a trade-off between patient autonomy and prevention of harms to others. Adjudicating whether testing 
can be made mandatory requires considering issues about how data is used and whether there are 
ancillary obligations owed to test subjects––or in short, requires considering diagnostic justice. Thanks 
to an anonymous referee for pushing for clarification on this point. 
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requires equality by default if: (a) there are not any relevant 
distinguishing feature between people that legitimate unequal 
distribution of advantages and disadvantages or (b) we do not 
have reliable ways of identifying and measuring the unequal 
claims people may have. (Lysdahl and Hoffman 2021, 21) 
 
For our purposes, what is considered just or unjust when it comes to the 
ethical considerations of diagnostic testing will depend on the primary 
context in which the test is being used or conducted. That is, the purpose 
of testing in clinical settings, as we have seen, differs from the purpose of 
testing in the research trial setting, which in turn also differs from the 
purpose of testing in the public health setting, and these differences give 
rise to different ethical considerations. The ethical considerations and 
implications differ between these domains because the considerations of 
why to test as well as whom to test differ. 
 
The answer to the why and whom questions in the clinical setting is that 
tests should be performed on symptomatic patients in whom the test result 
would be likely to change the course of their clinical care (in terms of either 
treatment or supportive measures). If tests are scarce, however, and there 
are not enough such that all symptomatic patients can receive one, then 
distribution decisions should be made as fairly as possible. In the context 
of a research trial, on the other hand, the demands of diagnostic justice 
differ: testing should be conducted only on symptomatic patients in this 
context when it is not known whether or not the test results would change 
the course of their clinical care in any significant way.3  
 
Finally, in the context of public health, the answer to the why and whom to 
test questions is that the goal of testing is to contain the disease and testing 
should therefore be performed as widely, and on as many individuals, as 
possible (or at least, as is necessary for mitigation or successful 
surveillance). Further, the idea behind requiring testing in this context is 
that it would further the goal of mitigation or containment measures: the 
more people who are tested, the more likely it is that the disease will be 
successfully contained, especially if those in the population who test 
positive for active infection can be effectively isolated from others. This 
 
3 This epistemic requirement that it not be known ahead of time whether or not the treatment is 
effective is known as the principle of equipoise (Freedman 1987). According to Freedman, equipoise 
is the state of genuine uncertainty within the expert medical community on the best treatment for a 
condition. Thus it is a state that exists when some physicians or researchers favor one treatment (or 
expect it to work) while others favor another (or do not expect the one being tested to work). The idea 
is that this epistemic principle should be adhered to because if it is already known prior to the trial that 
the treatment works, then running the trial is a waste of time and financial resources, while, on the 
other hand, if it is already known prior to the trial that the treatment does not work, then the trial 
participants will be put at potential risk for no reason. 
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raises different distribution and allocation questions than in the case of 
clinical uses of testing for treatment. By way of partial analogy, in the 
context of justice in treatment allocation, in general, there are few 
restrictions on a competent adult patient’s right to refuse a treatment 
measure or intervention (Flanigan 2017), although there might be 
restrictions on a patient’s right to request these things. However, this is not 
as clearly the case when it comes to diagnostic testing for active 
surveillance purposes. In this situation, diagnostic testing is conducted not 
(solely) for the benefit of the individual being tested, but also to protect 
others in the society of which the infected person is a part.4  
 
Thus the answer to the question of whether it is sometimes, always, or 
never acceptable to force individuals to be tested in the public health 
context will depend on how one settles distributive questions about the 
burdens of testing when it comes to containment/mitigation measures 
specifically. In considering how testing resources are allocated and how 
the burdens and benefits of testing are distributed, the concept of diagnostic 
justice provides a lens through which to evaluate how these tensions can 
be resolved and how the different moral demands on testing can be 
balanced. For example, imagine that you (unfortunately) find yourself in 
the emergency department of your local hospital with a diagnosis of sepsis. 
The treatment for this condition is intravenous antibiotic therapy, generally 
with two or three agents (Schmidt and Mandel 2020). But suppose that the 
attending physician in this case decides not to treat you because she is 
aware that the more often any given antibiotic is prescribed, the more likely 
it is that bacteria in the community will develop resistance to it. So, she 
decides not to treat you in order to preserve the antibiotics’ effectiveness 
(Kennedy 2021). We might or might not agree with this physician’s 
decision, however, what we can agree on is that she is, in the process of 
making this decision, weighing the benefit of the intervention to the 
individual vs. the risk of the intervention to society at large. That is, what 
she is doing is weighing in on what is the most just all-things-considered 
action to take in the situation. This is the sort of normative reasoning that 
is also required when making testing/diagnostic decisions in the clinical, 
research and public health settings. And, in our view, this reasoning can be 







4 This is similar to the situation with vaccination––which is done not just for the benefit of the 
individual, but also for the benefit of the society in which that person resides. 
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4. Two Outstanding Difficulties in COVID Testing 
 
Testing for COVID-19 that is part of active surveillance and mitigation 
efforts, as well as screening for the disease to inform quarantine decisions 
or travel restrictions, raises two difficulties when it comes to diagnostic 
justice. These difficulties are outstanding, in the sense that they have not 
been adequately addressed in testing policy and thus different kinds of 
COVID-19 testing policies may fail to meet the demands of diagnostic 
justice. Though testing for COVID-19 as part of the response to the 
pandemic was put together on the fly in the face of the global health 
emergency posed by the disease, it is important to understand these 
difficulties so as to fine tune testing policy for future public health 
emergencies. 
 
A Diagnostic Misconception?5 
 
A central tenet of the ethics of clinical research since the Belmont Report 
has been the separation of therapy from research (Emanuel et al. 2000). 
Revelations about the deeply unethical Tuskegee Syphilis studies in the 
United States showed that blurring boundaries between research and 
therapy can cause enormous difficulties, making exploitation of subjects 
much easier and complicating the exercise of an individual’s right to 
withdraw from an experiment, among other issues.6 It is generally accepted 
that, in order for clinical research to be ethical, therapy must be detached 
from research, in practice and in the understanding of research subjects. 
 
Public health surveillance is similarly detached from therapy, in that the 
goals of public health surveillance are different from the goals of individual 
patient therapy. However, as happens in clinical research, individuals may 
not understand this difference. Patients’ participation in research because 
they mistake it for therapy is known as the therapeutic misconception 
(Applebaum et al. 1987; Miller and Rosenstein 2003). The therapeutic 
misconception raises significant problems for clinical research; it may 
compromise informed consent, particularly in cases where participants 
may believe that participation in the trial is actually tantamount to a novel 
form of treatment, when in fact they may be assigned to a control group 
 
5 We owe Peter Jaworski for suggesting this term to us. 
6 It is necessary to note that a complicating factor in this case is the deep and abiding systemic racism 
present in the United States, which shaped the Tuskegee case and was responsible for so many of its 
features. The issue in Tuskegee was not just that there was a blurring of the researcher/clinician roles, 
it was that Black individuals were preyed upon and treated as research materials in the guise of 
providing them with “care”. 
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and may receive little to no (medical) benefit from the trial at all.7 How to 
deal with the therapeutic misconception in clinical trials has been a 
significant subject of debate (Applebaum et al. 1987). 
 
Something very much like the therapeutic misconception may be operating 
in instances of disease surveillance as well. Individuals who consent to 
testing may not fully understand how their testing data will be used by 
public health decision-makers, may not understand procedures such as the 
deidentification of data or its use in contact tracing, and may believe that 
by submitting to testing, they will be facilitating their own clinical care. As 
an analogy, consider a study of adults in the UK about their attitudes 
towards contact tracing via smartphone (Williams et al. 2021). In this study 
researchers found that misconceptions about contact tracing data were 
widespread; individuals believed that contact tracing data would allow 
others to identify themselves, believed that contact tracing data had a kind 
of diagnostic function (to identify close contacts with COVID-19 so that 
they could understand their own risk of exposure), and did not understand 
how the data was being used by the government. What attitudes individuals 
have towards testing is an empirical question, and no doubt there will be 
significant research on this in the future; but it is not hard to imagine that 
similar misconceptions are involved with COVID-19 testing, at least at the 
present time. 
 
This poses a difficulty relating to diagnostic justice for three reasons. First, 
individuals may be submitting to testing based on mistaken understandings 
of the use of the data and the purpose of the testing. As in the case of the 
therapeutic misconception in research ethics, this may compromise 
individuals’ ability to give informed consent. Second, these 
misconceptions may be playing a part in motivating participation in testing 
in ways that raises worries about exploitation. In countries such as the 
United States where testing has been voluntary, it is possible that beliefs 
about the clinical relevance of testing data have played a part in individuals 
submitting to testing. And third, the opposite may be occurring––
misconceptions about testing may play a part in keeping some individuals 
from submitting to testing at all, thus complicating the active surveillance 
measures necessary to mitigate the pandemic.  
 
Added together, this raises a question about whether testing policy is 
exploiting these misconceptions to gather data. If that is the case, then 
testing policy, in order to be effective for active surveillance, would be 
 
7 They may be benefited in that they identify with the goals of the trial, and so even if participation 
doesn’t impact their health, they may consider it a benefit to have helped further the goals of the trial. 
Hans Jonas famously argued that identification with the goals of a clinical trial in this strong sense was 
a necessary condition for a clinical trial to be morally acceptable (Jonas 1969). 
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depending on a widespread diagnostic misconception––to perform active 
surveillance, testing policy is intentionally leaving a fuzzy line between 
clinical and public health uses of testing, and depending on the fuzziness 
of the situation to leave a gap in which individuals are motivated to seek 
testing under mistaken pretenses. This is an issue of diagnostic justice 
because it raises a major concern about fairness––if individuals are seeking 
testing because they believe it is part of getting care, and yet it neither 
furthers their own care goals nor is necessary for individual care, 
individuals are taking on the burden (however minimal that burden is) of 
testing without any benefit.8 
 
As with some forms of clinical research, testing for COVID-19 
surveillance also involves blurred lines between the collecting of data for 
research and the collecting of data for therapeutic purposes. Ideally, these 
two domains, along with their differing aims and ethical considerations 
should be kept separate. However, during public health emergencies, these 
lines are almost necessarily blurred. Clinicians become researchers and 
vice versa and are suddenly tasked with the considerations of both 
knowledge acquisition and patient care. We have seen this in the current 
pandemic, as data gathered in the course of the clinical care of COVID-19 
patients has both been made public and has been used to inform public 
health decision-making. For example, testing data from clusters identified 
at the beginning of the pandemic were instrumental in establishing that the 
disease is spread via aerosol transmission (Hamner et al. 2020). Unlike in 
(well-designed) clinical trials, there are no clear protocols on how to keep 
these roles separate. Further, this blurring of clinical and public health 
surveillance roles for testing and data gathering, both in the understanding 
of individuals submitting to testing and in the practices of both clinicians 
and researchers, could pose significant problems in the future. This is an 
area that requires further investigation and would greatly benefit from the 
development of clear protocols. 
 
Use of Data and Impacts on Communities 
 
It is well recognized that participation in research does not always benefit 
the individual participants involved, and because of this, what benefits are 
owed to research subjects has itself been a subject of intense debate within 
the ethics of clinical research (Richardson 2012). 
 
Similarly, participation in active surveillance by submitting to testing does 
not always benefit individuals or even their communities, and in fact can 
be used to inform decision-making that could potentially harm these 
 
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee, for pushing us to clarify this point. 
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communities. One of the major features of the COVID-19 pandemic has 
been the significant disparities in morbidity/mortality rates among 
different communities, with Hispanic, Latinx, Black, Indigenous, and 
Pacific Islander populations disproportionately affected by the disease 
(Hooper et al. 2020). These dynamics were noticed very early on in the 
pandemic, and yet data gathered from surveillance has done little to make 
a dent in this disparity. This is a significant concern for diagnostic justice; 
if testing as part of active surveillance reveals such significant and morally 
arbitrary disparities, it should, ideally, also inform policies that address 
these problems. Yet in the case of COVID-19, the opposite has been the 
case; upticks in infections revealed by active surveillance testing informed 
policies that seemed to have little to no impact on these disparities. A vivid 
example of this has been the US state of California, where an early 
lockdown likely mitigated the impact of the pandemic in the early months 
of the pandemic (Friedson et al. 2021), but where there have been massive 
disparities between lower-income and higher-income communities and 
white and Latinx communities in their respective burdens of COVID-19 
morbidity and mortality (Hsu and Hayes-Bautista 2021). Why data 
revealed from active surveillance indicated these disparities but policy did 
not adjust accordingly is a major issue that must be addressed in the wake 
of the pandemic. If active surveillance reveals such a disparity, but policy 
does nothing to ameliorate it, this looks like a significant failure of 
diagnostic justice, as the public health purposes of testing and compliance 
with testing requirements by community members did not result in any 
action that ameliorated the effects of the pandemic. 
 
The primary function of data gathered from active surveillance has, so far, 
been to inform when to impose different restrictions on businesses, 
schools, and other public activities. Different communities have 
experimented with various metrics in an effort to determine when it is safe 
to permit school openings, religious services, dine-in service at restaurants, 
and the like. As an example, New York City, in the United States, 
established fairly early on in the pandemic a metric of a 3% test positivity 
rate for opening public schools (Shapiro 2020). These restrictions, 
however, do not benefit or harm everyone equally; in New York City, the 
effects of closing public schools have primarily been felt by lower-income 
communities (Agostinelli et al. 2020). There are also worries about the 
disproportionate long-term effects of lockdowns from lost income, mental 
health impacts, and the like (Winsberg et al. 2020).9 During the COVID-
19 pandemic, testing data has informed these policies. Testing data, then, 
 
9 We bracket here any comment on Winsberg et al.’s claim that these long-term effects show that trade-
offs from lockdowns raise a high epistemic barrier to imposing such lockdowns, and that this barrier 
was not met in the early months of the pandemic (Winsberg et al. 2020). 
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can be used in such a way that informs policy-decisions that impose 
burdens, but in which burdens are not distributed equitably, in which 
burdens fall disproportionately on some communities and not others. If 
testing data gathered during active surveillance informs policies that not 
only do not ameliorate the impacts of the pandemic on disproportionately 
affected communities, but actually generate some significant harms of their 





Our discussion of diagnostic testing and diagnostic justice has implications 
not just for COVID-19 testing but for testing policy for future public health 
emergencies. As we have seen, testing for COVID-19 as part of active 
surveillance efforts can involve a blurring of the boundaries between 
public health and clinical medicine. Since test results are obviously 
relevant for an individual’s health, testing as part of active surveillance and 
mitigation efforts at least has some relevance for individuals, even if that 
is not the primary goal of the testing. Given this, it may be that testers have 
obligations to individuals who report for testing as part of active 
surveillance efforts, even if the primary aim is not clinical but is to provide 
data for mitigation efforts. These obligations, for testing as part of active 
surveillance, may be minimal: timely return of results, clinical advice and 
direction to care resources, communication of results to individuals in a 
clear fashion, and the like may be sufficient to discharge the duties 
resulting from the partial entrustment of individuals’ health to testers. 
However minimal, meeting these requirements may be necessary to ensure 
that benefits from testing are distributed equitably. Some individuals may 
be better placed to take advantage of information gained from testing 
without additional resources or aid from public health officials. Building 
in resources to meet obligations of care to those who submit to testing may 
be necessary to help remove these inequities, and ensure that those who 
submit to testing receive some (clinical) benefit from doing so, as well as 
those who benefit from mitigation efforts. 
 
Though minimal, this hasn’t always been the case with active surveillance 
measures during epidemics. During the 2013-2016 Upper West Africa 
Ebola epidemic, the focus throughout, from the very earliest days, was on 
containment, instead of care (Farmer 2020). Pressure from the world 
community on Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia led to a channeling of 
resources into identification and isolation of cases, in the hopes of breaking 
transmission chains, and this extended as well to testing and contact 
tracing. Much of the containment and mitigation effort was put in the hands 
of the military, which employed coercive measures aimed at containment 
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(such as the infamous cordon sanitaire) (McNeill 2014). As the medical 
historian Frank Snowden argues, the response to Ebola involved a 
resurrection of the tactics used to fight infectious disease in the dark ages 
of medicine, rather than a 21st century, biomedically sophisticated effort 
aimed at both care and mitigation:  
 
Many of the coercive means adopted echoed early modern 
Europe’s effort to defend itself against bubonic plague (…). 
Compulsory treatment facilities surrounded by troops even 
closely resembled lazarettos. Daniel Defoe would have found 
the response familiar. (Snowden 2019, 495). 
 
Besides the obvious wrong of failing to provide even minimal supportive 
care to those suffering from Ebola Virus Disease, this also hampered 
mitigation efforts, as the (correct) perception that public health authorities 
(including some, but not all, foreign support) were more interested in 
containment than in caring for the sick sowed distrust and resentment, and 
led to (sometimes violent) backlash among the population of the three most 
affected countries. Though testing during the Upper West African Ebola 
epidemic was not nearly on the scale of the current worldwide efforts to 
test for SARS-CoV-2, and there are many relevant differences in the 
dynamics of the two epidemics, the contrast between the two events shows 
how employing active surveillance without providing any clinical support 
leads not just to serious harms but is counterproductive to mitigation.10 
This has important implications for global health ethics and public health 
policy looking forward: the separation of care from mitigation is neither 
normatively nor practically possible, and active surveillance measures, 
including testing for this purpose, must recognize the requirements of care 
to the individuals being tested in order to equitably distribute the burdens 






We have argued in this paper that considerations of diagnostic justice 
generate moral demands on testing policy as part of public health 
 
10 There are many reasons, of course, for the differences between the two events: the Upper West 
Africa Ebola epidemic occurred in a region with minimal clinical resources (Farmer 2020), the 
epidemic was concentrated in Upper West Africa despite some sporadic imported infections (and 
limited secondary transmission) elsewhere in Africa, Europe, and the United States, and the different 
stigmas, biases, and prejudices about Ebola and those suffering most from it during the epidemic made 
it far easier to “other” those in need of care and thus to direct resources elsewhere than has been the 
case with COVID-19, although there is also plenty of stereotyping of individuals susceptible to the 
disease in the latter case as well (Aronson 2020). 
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surveillance during infectious disease epidemics. The current and ongoing 
SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic has revealed many of the dynamics 
involved with testing as part of active surveillance during these events and 
provided important lessons for the general question of what would 
constitute an ethical testing regime for active surveillance during 
epidemics. This, unfortunately, looks likely to be a significant question for 
global health in the foreseeable future. The first two decades of the 21st 
century have already seen a number of significant public health events 
involving novel and emerging pathogens––SARS, H1N1, Ebola, and now 
COVID-19. Collectively, these have already cost the lives of millions of 
people, in the form of premature death from infection and illness. There 
are plenty of reasons to believe this is not just bad luck; some of the 
dynamics of our world––further encroachment into the wildland-urban 
interface (which provides increased opportunities for zoonosis), 
intensifying urbanization of the world’s population, the high volume of 
international air travel, and continuing, morally pernicious disparities in 
access to basic health care resources in many parts of the world––all 
provide ample opportunities for emerging pathogens to spark epidemics 
(Bollyky 2018). 11  A just and sustainable world will require just and 
sustainable global health policy, which includes testing protocols for 





Versions of this paper were presented at the Georgetown Institute for the 
Study of Markets and Ethics at Georgetown University in April 2021, and 
the Philosophical Perspectives on COVID-19 Workshop at the University 
of Johannesburg in May 2021. Thanks to audiences at both, for their 
helpful comments and suggestions (and thanks to Sahar Akhtar for inviting 
us to Georgetown and to Alex Broadbent for organizing the Johannesburg 
workshop). The idea for this paper came out of an exchange between both 
authors during the Q&A for a presentation one author (Kennedy) gave to 
 
11  The causal claims involved in theories about the vulnerability of the contemporary world to 
infectious disease generate interesting questions in the philosophy of science in their own right; but 
some of the narratives and rhetoric in the presentation of these claims can echo problematic ideas about 
developing countries from past decades. Some of this is the case with Bollyky’s treatment, especially 
his discussion of the role of urbanization in developing countries and population increases due to 
progress in combating childhood mortality (Bollyky 2018). Others draw different lessons; Deaton 
(2013) and Farmer (2020), for instance, see the unique zoonotic opportunities provided by urbanization 
and encroachment on the urban-wildland interface in developing countries as evidence of the severe 
risks and injustices posed by lack of public health infrastructure and clinical resources; or rather, as 
evidence not that, as Bollyky puts it, “the world is getting healthier in worrisome ways”, but rather that 
persistent injustices in access to health care and other basic goods create significant risks for all. 
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the PDXPhiSciNOW philosophy of the life sciences workshop in 
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